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Abstract
Many important practical markets inherently involve the interaction of strategic buyers with
strategic sellers. A fundamental impossibility result for such two-sided markets due to Myer-
son and Satterthwaite [33] establishes that even in the simplest such market, that of bilateral
trade, it is impossible to design a mechanism that is individually rational, truthful, (weakly)
budget balanced, and efficient. Even worse, it is known that the “second best” mechanism—the
mechanism that maximizes social welfare subject to the other constraints—has to be carefully
tailored to the Bayesian priors and is extremely complex.
In light of this impossibility result it is very natural to seek “simple” mechanisms that are
approximately optimal, and indeed a very active line of recent work has established a broad
spectrum of constant-factor approximation guarantees, which apply to settings well beyond
those for which (implicit) characterizations of the optimal (second best) mechanism are known.
In this work, we go one step further and show that for many fundamental two-sided markets—
e.g., bilateral trade, double auctions, and combinatorial double auctions—it is possible to design
near-optimal mechanisms with provable, constant-factor approximation guarantees with just a
single sample from the priors! In fact, most of our results in addition to requiring less information
also improve upon the best known approximation guarantees for the respective setting.
1 Introduction
Recently, increased attention has turned to the problems that arise in two-sided markets, in which
the set of agents is partitioned into buyers and sellers. In contrast to the one-sided setting (where
one could say that the mechanism itself initially holds the items), in the two-sided setting the
items are initially held by the sellers, who have valuations over the items they hold, and who are
assumed to act rationally and strategically. The mechanism’s task is now to decide which buyers
and sellers should trade, and at which prices, with the goal of maximizing the social welfare of
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the reallocation of the goods. Two-sided markets are usually studied in a Bayesian setting: there
is public knowledge of probability distributions, one for each buyer and one for each seller, from
which the valuations of the buyers and sellers are drawn.
In two-sided markets, a further important requirement is strong budget balance (SBB), which
states that monetary transfers happen only among the agents in the market, i.e., the buyers and
sellers are allowed to trade without leaving to the mechanism any share of the payments, and
without the mechanism adding money to the market. A weaker version of SBB often considered
in the literature is weak budget balance (WBB), which only requires the mechanism not to inject
money into the market. However, it is known from the work of [33] that it is generally impossible
for an individually rational (IR), Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), and WBB mechanism to
maximise social welfare in such a market, even in the bilateral trade setting, i.e., when there is just
one seller and one buyer and public knowledge of the distribution of agents’ values. This is in sharp
contrast to the celebrated optimal results available for one-sided markets [32, 43].
A recent line of research has focused on mechanisms that satisfy IR, SBB, and IC (or failing
that, the weaker notion of BIC), and that reallocate the items in such a way that the expected
social welfare is within some constant fraction of the optimum, where the expectation is taken
over the given probability distributions of the agents’ valuations and over the random choices of
the mechanism. Such mechanisms circumvent the impossibility result of [33] by weakening the
requirement of optimal social welfare to that of approximately optimal social welfare.
Important special cases of two-sided markets that have been considered with the aforementioned
goal include: bilateral trade with one buyer and one seller [8, 24]; double auctions in which unit-
demand buyers interact with multiple sellers that each hold a single copy of an identical item
[13, 19]; and combinatorial double auctions in which the buyers have combinatorial (e.g., fractionally
subadditive (XOS)) valuations and the sellers hold non-identical items [7, 14].
We improve on the existing results in two ways. First of all, we give the first two-sided market
mechanisms with limited information. More concretely, we show how to obtain mechanisms for
two-sided markets that satisfy IR, BB, IC, and that achieve a constant factor approximation of
the optimum social welfare, even when the mechanism only knows a single sample from each
distribution of the buyers and of the sellers. Secondly, in some cases, we are able to improve over
previous bounds obtained with full knowledge of the distributions. Our work is close in spirit to
the previous works on one-side mechanism design that obtain approximately optimal revenue with
limited information about an existing distribution of bidders’ values [12, 18, 23], and to the previous
work on prophet inequalities with limited information from the distributions [2, 16, 17, 38].
1.1 Overview of the Results
This paper studies the problem of designing mechanisms for two-sided markets in the Bayesian
setting with limited information: that is we consider the case in which both buyers’ and sellers’
valuations are private information drawn from independent, arbitrary distributions that are known
through a limited number of samples. If not specified otherwise, a single sample is available from
each distribution. We study this problem in various settings, summarized in Table 1.
1.1.1 Bilateral Trade
As a warm up, we consider the bilateral trade setting with one buyer b with valuation vb „ Fb and a
seller s with valuation vs „ Fs. We present an IR, IC, SBB mechanism that gives a 2-approximation
Setting IR+IC SBB WBB Approximation Samples Arrivals Poly
bilateral trade X X 2 No/Yes ´´´ Yes
double auction
matroid X X 3`
?
3 No/Yes Off/Off Yes
double auction
k-uniform matroid X X 1` 3.73p1 ` op1qq No/Yes OnRa/OnRa Yes
double auction
k-uniform matroid X X 1` 3.73p1 ` op1qq No/Yes OnFi/OnRa Yes
combinatorial
XOS X X 3 No/Yes Off/Off No
combinatorial
submodular/XOS X X Opplog logmq3q No/Yes Off/Off Yes
combinatorial
GS X X 3 No/Yes Off/Off Yes
combinatorial
unit demand X X 2e No/Yes OnRa/Off Yes
Table 1: Overview of single-sample mechanisms for two-sided markets that we develop in this paper.
The samples column indicates whether we need a single sample from the buyer side and seller side.
The arrival column specifies the arrival order of the buyers and sellers. Off stands for offline, OnFi
for online fixed order, and OnRa for online random order.
using a single sample from Fs as posted price for the agents. We also show that no deterministic IC
mechanism (all IC mechanisms are posted price [13]) that uses just a single sample from Fs or just
a single sample from Fb can do better. Our result achieves the same approximation bound obtained
when Fs is known by posting a price equal to the median of Fs [8]. Our mechanism also matches
with just one sample the best possible result that can be obtained by a deterministic mechanism
that uses only Fs or only Fb [8]. The work of [8] also gives a randomized mechanism that achieves
a e{pe´ 1q-approximation by using full knowledge of Fs. We show a IC, IR, SBB mechanism that
gives a pe{pe ´ 1q ` ǫq-approximation using 16e2
ǫ2
log
`
4
ǫ
˘
samples from Fs.
1.1.2 Double Auctions
In the double auction setting, there are n unit-demand buyers and m unit-supply sellers with
identical items. Buyer valuations are drawn from Fb1 , . . . , Fbn , and seller valuations are drawn
from Fs1 , . . . , Fsm , independently. We distinguish between offline and online mechanisms. In offline
mechanisms, the agents can trade in any order. For online mechanisms, the agents can trade in
online fixed order or in online random order. We also consider additional constraints on the set of
buyers that can trade simultaneously in the form of downward closed set systems that captures for
example matroid settings. We prove the following main theorem (informal version):
Theorem 1. Denote by α the approximation guarantee of an offline/online one-sided IC, IR,
single-sample mechanism for the intersection of a downward closed set system I with a m-uniform
matroid. We give a two-sided single-sample IR, IC, SBB mechanism for double auctions with con-
straints I on the buyers that yields in expectation a p1`1{p2´?3q¨αq « p1`3.73¨αq approximation
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to the expected optimal social welfare. The mechanism inherits the same online/offline properties
of the one-sided mechanism on the buyer side and it is online random order on the seller side.
For general matroid settings, by applying the optimal offline truthful VCG mechanism on the
buyer side, we obtain a 3`?3 « 4.73-approximate single-sample two-sided mechanism for double
auctions for general matroid constraints on the buyers. This improves over the best known ap-
proximation guarantee of 6 due to Colini-Baldeschi et al. [14] for this problem obtained with full
knowledge of Fb1 , . . . , Fbn and Fs1 , . . . , Fsm !
We obtain two single-sample online mechanisms for the two-sided setting with different infor-
mation requirements and for different online arrival models by using the truthful 1 ` Op1{?kq-
competitive secretary algorithm for k-uniform matroids due to Kleinberg [25] or the truthful
1 ` Op1{?kq-competitive single-sample prophet inequality for k-uniform matroids due to Azar
et al. [2]. The resulting approximation guarantees of « 1 ` 3.73p1 ` Op1{amintn,muqq improve
for a large spectrum of values of n and m over the best known bound of 6 for this problem [14]
obtained with full knowledge of the distributions.
Observe that any future advances on α-approximate secretary algorithms or single-sample
prophet inequalities for the intersection of any matroid (partition matroid, graphical matroid, etc.)
with a k-uniform matroid constraint would lead to a new p1` 3.73 ¨ αq-approximate single-sample
two-sided mechanism with online arrivals.
1.1.3 Combinatorial Double Auctions
We also consider combinatorial double auctions with n buyers having combinatorial valuations
for sets of items and m unit-supply sellers with non-identical items. Buyer valuation functions
vb : 2
S Ñ Rě0 are drawn from Fb,S , S P 2S . Seller valuations are drawn from Fs1 , . . . , Fsm ,
independently. We specifically consider fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations. We prove the
following main theorem (informal version):
Theorem 2. Denote by α the approximation guarantee of any one-sided IR, IC offline/online
single-sample mechanism for maximizing social welfare for XOS valuations. We give a two-sided
single-sample mechanism for combinatorial double auctions with XOS buyers and unit-supply sellers
that is IR, IC, WBB, and provides in expectation a p2α`1tα ă 1.5uq approximation. The two-sided
mechanism inherits the offline/online properties of the one-sided mechanism on the buyer side and
is offline on the seller side.
This result implies a (non-computational) 3-approximation for XOS valuations via the VCG
mechanism. A Oppolyplog logmqq-approximate poly-time mechanism in the demand oracle model
for XOS valuations follows from the recent breakthrough of [1] and a 3-approximate poly-time
mechanism for Gross Substitute (GS) valuations follows from the LP-based poly-time algorithm of
Nisan and Segal [35] or the poly-time algorithms for convolutions of M 7-valuation functions [30, 31]
(also see the excellent survey [36] for the latter).
In the special case of unit-demand buyers and unit supply sellers with non-identical items, we
obtain a single sample IR, IC, WBB mechanism that yields a 2e « 5.44-approximation that is online
random order on the buyer side and offline on the seller side. The mechanism uses the one-sided
online truthful e-approximate secretary matching mechanism [37].
These results compare with the IR, IC, SBB 6-approximation mechanism for XOS valuations
and unit supply sellers of [14] with full knowledge of the distributions that is online on the buyer
side and offline on the seller side.
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Again, any future improvements in the one-sided problem (whether offline or online) will trans-
late into two-sided results through our theorem(s).
1.2 Techniques
Our techniques are very different from those in prior work on revenue-maximizing one-sided mech-
anisms from samples [12, 18, 23], and also from the prophet inequalities with limited information
literature [2, 16, 17, 38].
A first challenge that we encounter, and show how to solve approximately with a single sample,
already occurs in the bilateral trade case. The difficulty here is to decide whether any given buyer-
seller “couple” pb, sq with valuations vb and vs should trade. Ideally, they would trade whenever
vb ě vs. However, as we know from [33] we can’t achieve this with a IR, IC, and BB mechanism;
and a constant factor loss is unavoidable [13].
Our solution to this problem is simple (but the analysis requires some care!): Simply draw a
single sample from the seller distribution and post this a price, and let the buyer and seller trade if
the buyer’s value is above this price and the seller’s value is below. Clearly, this entails some loss,
namely whenever the buyer has a higher valuation then the seller but either both are below the
price (and so the buyer does not accept) or both are above the price (and so the seller does not
accept). However, as we show, the loss is not too bad: posting the seller sample as a price will, in
expectation, recover 1{2 of the optimal social welfare.
Our analysis of this bilateral trade case indeed applies to any fixed value vb, and we exploit
this for our double auction results. Here we show that approximately optimal solutions result
from combining one-sided mechanisms that (approximately) choose an optimal set of buyers (the
k highest buyers in the unconstrained case), and randomly match the tentatively selected buyers
to the sellers, maxing the price that the buyers would face in the one-sided mechanism with the
single sample from the respective seller’s distribution.
The second—and main—challenge arises when going from single parameter to multi-parameter
settings with non-identical items, because here we can’t just randomly match buyers to sellers (as
this would jeopardize the approximation guarantee), but if we don’t just match them randomly
ensuring truthfulness becomes a very tricky thing!
Our solution to this is to modify any given one-sided mechanism for the buyers by discounting
the buyer’s valuations for the different items by the respective seller’s sample valuations. We show
that selecting allocations based on this, proposing these (possibly set-wise) trades to the buyers and
sellers, increasing the payments asked from the buyers as determined by the one-sided mechanism
by the respective seller samples, and offering the sellers to trade at “their” sample, yields an IR,
IC, and WBB mechanism. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, this same mechanism also ensures
near-optimal social welfare!
1.3 Further Related Work
There are two important precursors to the more recent work on approximately optimal simple
mechanisms for two-sided markets: The first studies the non-truthful buyer’s bid mechanism in a
double auction setting with i.i.d. buyers and i.i.d. sellers, and shows convergence to efficiency as
the number of sellers and buyers grows to infinity [39–41]. The second is work on trade reduction
mechanisms [3, 4, 19, 27], which starts from McAfee’s truthful trade reduction mechanism for double
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auctions, which extracts a p1´ 1{ℓq fraction of the maximum social welfare, where ℓ is the number
of traders in the optimal solution.
A number of recent works [5, 9, 10, 15, 28, 42] has considered the related objective of optimizing
the gain from trade, which measures the expected increase in total value that is achievable by
applying the mechanism, with respect to the initial allocation to the sellers. Gain from trade
is harder to approximate than social welfare, and Op1q approximations of the optimal Bayesian
mechanism are only possible in BIC implementations.
Goldner et al. [21] recently suggested an alternative, resource augmentation approach to gains
from trades in two-sided markets, in the spirit of the celebrated result of Bulow and Klemperer
[11]. They ask how many buyers (resp. sellers) need to be added into the market so that a variant
of McAfee’s trade reduction mechanism yields a gain from trade superior to the optimal gains
from trade in the original market. As a side product they obtain a 4-approximate single-sample
mechanism for gains from trade under natural conditions on the distributions.
Another related line of work considers the problem of maximizing revenue in double auction
settings, either in static environments [22, 34] or in dynamic environments [6]. A variation where
both buyers and sellers arrive dynamically and the mechanism can hold on to items was investigated
in [20, 26].
Our work is also related to prior work which has studied how incentive compatible mechanisms
can be composed in an incentive compatible manner, such as [29] in the context of one-sided markets
and [19] in the context of two-sided markets.
2 Model and Definitions
Two-Sided Markets. In a two-sided market we are given a set of n buyers B and a set of m
sellers S. Each seller s has a single indivisible item for sale. Every seller s has a private valuation
vs P Rě0 for the item she sells. Each buyer b has a private valuation function vb : 2S Ñ Rě0,
mapping each set of sellers to a non-negative real. We write vB and vS for the vector of buyer
valuations and seller valuations, respectively. Buyer and seller valuations are drawn independently
from distributions Fb for b P B and Fs for s P S.
In our model, sellers have a single indivisible item for sale. We refer to such sellers as unit supply
sellers. The valuation functions of the buyers will be constrained to come from some class of func-
tions V. Buyers are unit demand if for each buyer b and set of sellers S, vbpSq “ maxsPStvbptsuqu.
Buyers have fractionally subadditive (or XOS) valuations if for each buyer b and every set of sellers
S, vbpSq “ maxaPAb
ř
sPS apsq, where Ab is a set of additive valuation functions.
We say that items are identical if the valuation function vbpSq of all buyers b only depends on
the cardinality of the set S they receive, i.e., for all b and all S, S1 Ď S with |S| “ |S1| we have
vbpSq “ vbpS1q. Otherwise, items are non-identical.
We also allow for constraints on which buyers can trade simultaneously. We express these
constraints through set systems IB Ď 2B. We require these set systems IB to be downward closed.
That is, whenever X Ď Y and Y P IB, then also X P IB. Of particular importance for our work will
bematroids, i.e., downward-closed set systems that additionally satisfy a natural exchange property.
Formally: Whenever A,B P I and |S| ą |B| then there exists a P AzB such that B Y tau P I. A
special case are k-uniform matroids where A P I whenever |A| ď k.
An allocation is a partition of the sellers S into n disjoint sets pS1, . . . , Snq, i.e., Ťi Si Ď S and
SiXTj “ H for all i ‰ j, with the interpretation that buyer bi for 1 ď i ď n receives the items of the
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sellers in Si. An allocation A “ pS1, . . . , Snq is feasible if the set of buyers BA “ tbi P B | Si ‰ Hu
that receive a non-empty allocation is admissible (i.e., BS P IB). The social welfare of an allocation
A “ pS1, . . . , Snq is given by the sum of the valuations that buyers bi for 1 ď i ď n have for the
items of the sellers in their respective sets Si plus the valuations of the sellers that are not assigned
to any buyer, i.e.,
SWpAq “ SWpS1, . . . , Snq “
ÿ
biPB
vbipSiq `
ÿ
sPS,sRŤi Si
vs.
We use OPTpvB, vSq to denote the feasible allocation that maximizes social welfare.
Mechanisms. A (direct revelation) mechanism M “ px, pq receives bids bidb : 2S Ñ Rě0 from
each buyer b P B and bids P Rě0 from each seller s P S. The bids of the buyers are constrained to
be consistent with the class of functions V of their valuations. Bids represent reported valuations,
and need not be truthful. In analogy to our notation for valuations, we use bidB and bidS for the
vector of bids of all buyers or all sellers, respectively.
A mechanism M is defined through an allocation rule x : Vn ˆRmě0 Ñ
Śn
i“1 2
S and a payment
rule p : Vn ˆ Rmě0 Ñ Rn`m.
The mapping from bids to feasible allocations can be randomized, in which case xpbidB, bidSq
is a random variable. The payments can also be randomized. We interpret the vector of payments
as the payments that the buyers need to make to the mechanism, and that the sellers receive from
the mechanism. We use the shorthand pbpbidB, bidSq and pspbidB, bidSq to refer to the payment
from buyer b to the mechanism and from the mechanism to seller. We require that ps “ 0 if seller
s keeps her item.
A mechanism is single-sample if the only information it is given about the two sets of distribu-
tions Fb for b P B and Fs for s P S is a single sample from each of these distributions.
Utilities. We assume that buyers and sellers have quasi-linear utilities, and that they are utility
maximizers. The utility uMb pvb, pbidB , bidSqq of buyer b with valuation function vb in mechanism
M “ px, pq under bids pbidB, bidSq is given by her valuation for the items she receives minus
payment. That is,
uMb pvb, pbidB, bidSqq “ E rvbpxipbidB, bidSqq ´ pbpbidB, bidSqs ,
where the expectation is over the randomness in the mechanism. The utility uMs pvs, pbidB, bidSqq of
a seller s in mechanism M “ px, pq under bids pbidB, bidSq is the payment she receives if she sells
the item and her valuation for her item otherwise. Formally,
uMs pvs, pbidB, bidSqq “ E r1ts’s item is soldu ¨ pspbidB, bidSq ` 1ts’s item is not soldu ¨ vss ,
where the expectation is over the randomness in the mechanism.
Goals. We seek to design mechanisms, and specifically single-sample mechanisms, with the fol-
lowing desirable properties:
(1) Individual Rationality. Mechanism M “ px, pq is individually rational (IR) if for all b P B
uMb pvb, pvB, vSqq ě 0 and for all s P S. uMs pvs, pvB, vSqq ě vs.
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(2) Incentive Compatibility. Mechanism M “ px, pq is (dominant-strategy) incentive compatible
(IC) or truthful if for each buyer b and each seller s, all valuation functions vb and vs, all possible
bids bidB by the buyers, and all possible bids by the sellers bidS , it holds that
uMb pvb, ppvb, bidBztbuq, bidSqq ě uMb pvb, pbidB , bidSqq, and
uMs pvs, pbidB, pvs, bidSztsuqqq ě uMs pvs, pbidB , bidSqq,
where bidBztbu denotes the set of all the buyer bids but b’s and bidSztsu denotes the set of all the
seller bids but s’s.
(3) Budget Balance. A truthful mechanism M “ px, pq is weakly budget balanced (WBB) if
E
«ÿ
bPB
pbpvB, vSq ´
ÿ
sPS
pspvB, vSq
ff
ě 0,
and it is strongly budget balanced (SBB) if the above holds with equality.
(4) Efficiency. Finally, a truthful mechanism M “ px, pq provides an α-approximation to the
optimal social welfare, for some α ě 1, if it holds that α ¨ErSWpxpvB, vSqqs ě ErSWpOPTpvB, vSqqs.
Remark. Our mechanisms will actually satisfy even stronger IR and BB properties in that they
will satisfy these conditions “ex post” (i.e., pointwise).
3 Warm-Up: Bilateral Trade
As a warm up we consider the important special case of bilateral trade where there is only a single
seller and a single buyer. Note that in this case it’s optimal to trade whenever the buyer’s value
exceeds that of the seller, so SWpvb, vsq “ maxtvb, vsu.
We show how to get a 2-approximation with just a single sample! Our mechanism, which we
refer to as SamplePrice, (Algorithm 1), couldn’t be simpler. It’s almost trivial: Draw a sample
from the seller distribution Fs and use this sample as a posted price.
Our mechanism differs from the strategies employed in prior work in that it does not choose a
posted price that corresponds to the median (or other quantiles) of the seller distribution.
ALGORITHM 1: SamplePrice
Sample P „ Fs
if vB ě P and vS ď P then
// Let the seller and the buyer trade
xB “ s, pB “ pS “ P
end
Theorem 3. Algorithm SamplePrice is individually rational, truthful, strongly budget balanced
and provides, in expectation over the sample, a 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
8
Proof. It is easy to verify that SamplePrice is IR, IC, and SBB. So all we need to show is that
it achieves the claimed approximation guarantee.
To this end let vs, vb, and P denote the random variables that correspond to the seller valuation,
the buyer valuation, and the price chosen by SamplePrice; and use vˆs, vˆb, and Pˆ to denote
specific realizations of these random variables. Let SWpP, vs, vbq denote the random variable that
corresponds to the social welfare achieved by SamplePrice.
We will use an insight from [8], namely that it suffices to show the approximation ratio for any
fixed buyer value vˆb and truncated seller values v˜s “ vs^ vˆb where values of vs above vˆb are mapped
to vˆb. This simplifies the benchmarking as under this condition it is always optimal to assign the
item to the buyer. That is, we want to show that
2 ¨ E rSWpP, vb, v˜sq | vb “ vˆbs ě E rmaxtvb, v˜su | vb “ vˆbs “ vˆb.
SamplePrice transfers the item from the seller to the buyer whenever P P rv˜s, vbs, otherwise
the seller keeps her item. So,
E rSWpP, vb, v˜sq | vb “ vˆbs “ E rvˆb ¨ 1tP P rv˜s, vˆbsus ` E rv˜s ¨ 1tP R rv˜s, vˆbsus .
If we condition with respect to the event vs ě vˆb and vs ă vˆb, we have:
E rSWpP, vb, v˜sq | vb “ vˆbs ě vˆb ¨ P pP P rvs, vˆbsq ` vˆb ¨ P pvs ą bq .
Let y “ P pvs ą vˆbq P r0, 1s. To complete the proof we will show that P pP P rvs, vˆbsq ě p1´yq2{2.
This will then show the claim as then
E rSWpP, vb, v˜sq | vb “ vˆbs ě vˆb ¨ P pP P rvs, vˆbsq ` vˆb ¨ P pvs ą vˆbq
ě p1´ yq
2
2
¨ vˆb ` y ¨ vˆb “ p1` y2q vˆb
2
ě vˆb
2
.
It remains to prove the non-trivial part of this proof, which is that P pP P rvs, vˆbsq ě p1´ yq2{2.
Recall our notation that Fspxq “ P pvs ď xq for all x, and that we defined y “ P pvs ą vˆbq “
1´ Fspvˆbq. Then with U „ U r0, 1s and F´1s pxq “ inf ty P R | Fspyq ě xu the pseudo-inverse of Fs:
P pP P rvs, vˆbsq “ E
”
E r1tP P rvs, vˆbsu | P s
ı
“ E
”
E r1tP ě vsu | P s ¨ 1tP ď vˆbu
ı
“ E rFspP q ¨ 1tP ď vˆbus
“ E “FspF´1s pUqq ¨ 1 F´1s pUq ď vˆb(‰ (1)
ě E “U ¨ 1 F´1s pUq ď vˆb(‰ (2)
“ E rU ¨ 1tU ď Fspvˆbqus “
ż
1´y
0
t dt “ p1´ yq
2
2
, (3)
where in (1) we have used the property that F´1s pUq is distributed exactly like P (see, for example,
[44] for a proof), in (2) that FspF´1s pxqq ě x and in (3) the fact that Fs is non-decreasing.
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In Appendix A we show that it’s not possible to “derandomize” SamplePrice by simply posting
the mean of the seller distribution.
Our next theorem shows that our analysis of SamplePrice is tight, and that’s it is best
possible among “deterministic” mechanisms that only use a single sample from the buyer or the
seller distribution. A proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. Every posted-price mechanism that receives a single sample from the buyer distribution
or a single sample from the seller distribution and sets a deterministic price for each sample it may
receive has approximation ratio at least 2.
In Appendix C we propose the SampleQuantile mechanism, which receives ℓ ě 1 samples
from FS and show the following performance guarantee.
Theorem 5. Mechanism SampleQuantile is individually rational, truthful, and budget balanced.
For every ε P p0, 4
e
q, given ℓ “ 16e2
ε2
logp4
ε
q samples, it provides in expectation the following approx-
imation guarantee: ˆ
e
e´ 1 ` ε
˙
E rSWℓpvs, vbqs ě E rSWpOPTpvs, vbqqs .
4 Double Auctions
We now move on to to more general settings with multiple unit-demand buyers and multiple unit-
supply sellers with identical items. We present a general technique for turning truthful one-sided
mechanisms into truthful two-sided mechanisms.
The one-sided mechanisms we consider are for so-called binary single-parameter problems. In
such a problem, an agent i can either win or lose, and has a value vi for winning. The set of agents
that can simultaneously win is given by a set system I. The social welfare of a feasible set X P I
is simply the sum
ř
iPX vi of the winning agents’ valuations.
Given two set systems I and I 1 on a ground set U , we define its intersection to be the set
system that contains all sets X Ď U such that X P I and X P I 1.
Theorem 6. Denote by α the approximation guarantee of an offline/online one-sided IC, IR,
single-sample mechanism for welfare maximization in a binary single-parameter problem whose
feasible solutions correspond to the intersection of a downward-closed set system IB with a m-
uniform matroid. Then there is a two-sided single sample IR, IC, SBB mechanism for double
auctions with constraints IB on the buyers that yields in expectation aˆ
1` 1
2´?3 ¨ α
˙
« 1` 3.73 ¨ α
approximation to the expected optimal social welfare. Moreover, the mechanism inherits the same
online/offline properties of the one-sided mechanism on the buyer side and it is online random
order on the seller side.
We first provide a formal proof of the following special case, and then argue how to generalize
it.
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Theorem 7. Let k “ mintn,mu. There is a IR, IC, SBB, 1 ` 1
2´?3p1 ` Op1{
?
kqq-approximate
single-sample mechanism for unconstrained double auctions that approaches the buyers in online
fixed order and the sellers in online random order.
We give the mechanism for Theorem 7 in Section 4.1, and a proof of its properties in Section 4.2.
We explain how to generalize the construction and the proof in Section 4.3.
4.1 Mechanism for Theorem 7
Our mechanism—Two-Sided Rehearsal (Algorithm 2)—runs the one-sided Rehearsal algo-
rithm due to Azar et al. [2] to select the top k “ mintn,mu buyers. Azar et al. [2] show that
the combined value of the buyers that beat their price provides, in expectation, a 1 ` Op 1?
k
q
approximation to the expected value of the k highest buyers.
Our twist to this mechanism is that we pair buyers b that would be selected by the Rehearsal
algorithm with a random seller s, offering them to trade at a price that is the max of the respective
buyer’s pmin and the respective seller’s sample v
1
s.
This adds the needed component to take into account the valuations on the seller side of the
market, and will serve as an insurance that any good trade we propose has a good chance of actually
happening.
ALGORITHM 2: Two-Sided Rehearsal
Let P be the set of the k ´ 2?k largest buyer samples, together with 2?k copies of the
pk ´ 2?kq-largest buyer sample
Let pmin be the smallest element of P
Fix any order on the buyers (or assume buyers arrive online)
for each bi, in this order do
if vbi ą pmin then
Delete from P the highest value p P P such that vbi ą p
Pick uniformly at random s P S, delete s from S (or assume sellers arrive online)
Propose a trade to pbi, sq for the price of maxtv1s, pminu
if bi and s both agree then
Make the trade at this price
end
end
end
4.2 Proof of Theorem 7
We begin by showing that our two-sided mechanism inherits IR and IC from its one-sided counter-
part, and that it is strongly budget balanced.
Lemma 1. The Two-Sided Rehearsal mechanism is IR, IC, and SBB.
Proof. In Two-Sided Rehearsal no money is ever received by the mechanism itself. The only
exchange of money happens between buyer-seller pairs pbi, sq that also exchange an item. The
mechanism is therefore strongly budget balanced.
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It is also clear that the mechanism is individually rational as buyers and sellers would only
accept trades at prices that are lower resp. higher than their respective valuations.
Furthermore, the mechanism is truthful for agents on both sides of the market. Each buyer
is presented with a trading opportunity once; and the price depends only on the samples and the
valuations of previously considered buyers. She can only accept or reject, but never influence it—
and will therefore not profit from reporting a lower or higher value. Sellers, on the other hand, are
also guaranteed to be considered only once. They, too, have no means of influencing the price they
are presented with, and can only accept or reject.
It remains to show the claimed approximation guarantee. Just as in the case of bilateral trade,
we will do the bulk of the work for fixed buyer valuations.
Lemma 2. Fix n and m and let α denote the approximation guarantee of the Rehearsal algo-
rithm. The Two-Sided Rehearsal mechanism yields in expectation aˆ
1` 1
2´?3 ¨ α
˙
« p1` 3.73 ¨ αq
approximation to the expected optimal social welfare.
In what follows, we use M “ px, pq to refer to the one-sided version of Rehearsal, and
M 1 “ px1, p1q to refer to the two-sided version. We use B1 to denote the set of tentative buyers
chosen by M , we use B 1` to denote the set of buyers that end up with an item in M 1, and we use
S` to denote the set of sellers that keep their item in M 1. The expected social welfare achieved by
M 1 is:
ErSWpx1pvB, vSqqs “ E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs
ı
. (4)
The key bit in our proof is the following lemma, which relates the performance of the one-sided
mechanism to that of the two-sided mechanism.
Lemma 3. Let B1 denote the set of tentative buyers chosen by the one sided mechanism M , let
B 1` denote the set of buyers that trade in the two-sided mechanism M 1, and let S` denote the set
of sellers that keep their item in the two-sided mechanism M 1. Then,
E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs
ı
ě p2´?3q ¨ E
” ÿ
bPB1
vb
ı
.
Proof. In order to prove the lemma we will show that for any fixed buyer valuations vB, buyer
samples v1B, and corresponding set of tentative buyers B
1, in expectation over the seller valuations
vS , the seller samples v
1
S , and the randomness in the pairing of buyers and sellers,
E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs | B1, vB, v1B
ı
ě p2´?3q ¨
ÿ
bPB1
vb.
The actual claim then follows by taking expectation over buyer valuations vB, buyer samples
v1B, and the corresponding set of tentative buyers B
1.
In order to do the analysis let’s fix any buyer b P B1 with its value vb and tentative payment
pb. Let’s denote by s the random seller associated to b, and by vs and v
1
s two independent samples
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from that seller’s value distribution. Note that from buyer b’s perspective seller s is just a uniform
random seller from S.
The contribution of the couple pb, sq to the social welfare is vb if there is a sale and vs otherwise,
and there is a sale when vb ě maxtpb, v1su ě vs.
To analyze this contribution, we fix some constant t ě 0 which will be set later and we define
F ptq “ P pvs ď tq as the probability that a random draw vs from the distribution Fs of seller s
chosen uniformly at random from S is at most t.
If vb ě t, then the probability to have a sale is at least
P
`tv1s ď vbu X tvs ď pb _ v1su | t ď vb˘ ě P `tv1s ď tu X tvs ď v1su˘
ě P `tv1s ď tu X tvs ď v1su X tvs ď tu˘
ě P `vs ď v1s | tv1s ď tu X tvs ď tu˘P `tvs ď tu ` Xtv1s ď tu˘ ě 12F ptq2.
So the expected contribution is at least 1
2
F ptq2vb.
Else, if vb ă t, either there is a sale (and hence the contribution is vb ě vs) or there is not, and
hence the contribution is vs. So the expected contribution is at least
E rvs | t ą vbs “ E rvss “ E
“
v1s
‰ ě E “v1s ˇˇ v1s ě vb‰ ¨ P `v1s ě vb˘ ě p1´ F ptqqvb.
Putting the two cases together, we have that the contribution of buyer b and her random partner
s to the expected social welfare is at least
vb ¨max
t
min
 
1
2
Fv1sptq2, p1´ Fv1sptqq
(
(5)
We next show how to lower bound this term. For the sake of simplicity we present here the proof for
continuous seller distributions, the argument for general distributions is given in Appendix D. For
continuous seller distributions, 1
2
Fv1sptq2 is continuous and increasing while p1´Fv1sptqq is continuous
and decreasing, hence there exists a solution t‹ to
1
2
Fv1sptq2 “ p1´ Fv1sptqq. (6)
So a lower bound to (5) is given by
vb ¨ p1´ Fv1spt‹qq “ vb ¨ 12Fv1spt‹q2 “ vb ¨ p2´
?
3q.
One concise way to express the progress so far is:
E
” ÿ
aPpB1
`
Y S`qXtb,su
va | B1, vB, v1B
ı
ě p2´?3q ¨ vb, @b P B1 (7)
where the randomness is over the choice of the random seller s and its values vs and v
1
s. The above
holds for all buyers b, so we can sum up for all buyers in B1, then use linearity of expectation and
the fact that |B1| ď m to obtainÿ
bPB1
p2´?3q ¨ vb ď
ÿ
bPB1
E
” ÿ
aPpB1
`
Y S`qXtb,su
va | B1, vB, v1B
ı
ď E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs | B1, vB, v1B
ı
,
as claimed.
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We are now ready to prove the performance guarantee of the two-sided mechanism M 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that we use B 1` to denote the set of buyers that actually do get an item
in our two-sided mechanism M 1, and that we use S` to denote those sellers that do not make any
trade and keep their item. With this notation the expected social welfare achieved by our two-sided
mechanism M 1 is
ErSWpx1pvB, vSqqs “ E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs
ı
.
For a given set of valuations vB of the buyers, denote by OPTkpvBq the set of buyers with the k
highest values. We can upper bound the expected optimal social welfare by the optimal solution
for the buyers plus all seller values
ErSWpOPT pvB, vSqqs ď E
” ÿ
bPOPTkpvBq
vb
ı
` E
” ÿ
sPS
vs
ı
. (8)
Recall that the one-sided mechanism M 1 computes a set B1 of buyers whose accumulated expected
values are at least 1
α
times the expected one-sided optimum. Hence, for the considered buyers B1,
E
” ÿ
bPB1
vb
ı
ě 1
α
¨ E
” ÿ
bPOPTkpvBq
vb
ı
. (9)
By combining Inequality (9) with our upper bound on the expected optimal social welfare in
Inequality (8), we obtain
ErSWpOPT pvB, vSqqs ď α ¨ E
” ÿ
bPB1
vb
ı
` E
” ÿ
sPS
vs
ı
. (10)
First consider the second term on the right hand side of Inequality (10). In our two-sided mechanism
M 1 sellers trade only if they are matched to a buyer with higher valuation. Therefore, we can replace
as follows:
ErSWpOPT pvB, vSqqs ď α ¨ E
” ÿ
bPB1
vb
ı
` E
” ÿ
sPS`
vs `
ÿ
bPB1
`
vb
ı
.
Now consider the first term on the right hand side of Inequality (10). Our two-sided mechanism
M 1 does not make trades for each buyer in B1. Despite the fact that generally B1 ‰ B 1` , as we
show in Lemma 3, in expectation, p2´?3q ¨E rřbPB1 vbs is a lower bound on our mechanism’s social
welfare. Using this we obtain
ErSWpOPT pvB, vSqqs ď α
2´?3 ¨ E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs
‰` E ” ÿ
sPS`
vs `
ÿ
bPB1
`
vb
ı
.
All in all, we get:
ErSWpOPT pvB, vSqqs ď
ˆ
1` α
2´?3
˙
¨ E
” ÿ
bPB1
`
vb `
ÿ
sPS`
vs
ı
,
as claimed.
14
4.3 Proof of Theorem 6
For the more general result in Theorem 6 we run the given one-sided mechanism on the intersection
of the given feasibility constraint pB,IBq with a m-uniform matroid. This gives a set of tentative
buyers B1 along with tentative buyer prices pB. We can then randomly match the tentative buyers
to sellers, offering buyer-seller pairs pb, sq to trade at price maxtpb, v1su.
The proof that the resulting mechanism is IR, IC, and SBB is basically identical to that of
Lemma 1. They key is that truthfulness of the one-sided mechanism ensures that tentative buyers
want an opportunity to trade, and cannot manipulate the price they face for this opportunity.
For the performance analysis we claim that Lemma 2 applies more generally with α being
the approximation guarantee of the one-sided mechanism. In fact, the only change to the above
proof that is required for this generalization is to redefine OPTk as the optimal one-sided solution
containing at most k “ mintn,mu buyers.
5 Combinatorial Double Auctions
Up to this point, our results were for unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers with identical
items. This means that we have focused on so called single-parameter settings. In this section, we
give up on this assumption and turn towards multi-parameter versions of our techniques, which
implies a whole set of complications that our methods need to handle in addition.
Theorem 8. Denote by α the approximation guarantee of any one-sided IR, IC offline/online
single-sample mechanism Mα for maximizing social welfare for XOS valuations. We give a two-
sided single-sample mechanism for combinatorial double auctions with XOS buyers and unit-supply
sellers that is IR, IC, WBB, and provides in expectation a p2α ` 1tα ă 1.5uq approximation. The
two-sided mechanism inherits the offline/online properties of the one-sided mechanism on the buyer
side and is offline on the seller side.
We describe the mechanism (resp. reduction) that achieves the properties claimed in Theorem 8
in Section 5.1, and establish that it actually achieves these properties in Section 5.2.
5.1 The Mechanism
The basic idea behind our mechanism 2XOS (Algorithm 3), is to run the given truthful one-
sided mechanism Mα on discounted buyer valuations and on a subset of the sellers. Note that the
problem can be viewed as finding a hypermatching in a bipartite hypergraph G “ pB Y S, E, vBq
with hyperedge set E defined as all tuples pb, Sq s.t. b P B, S Ď S.
First, given valuations vS and samples v
1
S for each seller, we determine a subset of the sellers
Sˆ as follows. For each s P S we put s in Sˆ if vs ď v1s. Otherwise, we will drop s from our
considerations. Next we determine discounted valuations. For a given buyer b and a given set of
sellers S Ď S let ab,S denote the additive supporting function of buyer b for set S. We define the
discounted valuation that buyer b has for the set of sellers S Ď Sˆ as:
vˆbpSq “
ÿ
sPS¯
pab,S¯psq ´ v1sq, where S¯ “ argmax
S‹ĎSXSˆ
#
vbpS‹q ´
ÿ
sPS‹
v1s
+
.
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We note that adjusting the valuations like this retains the XOS property of the original valuations.
A proof can be found in Appendix E. The same holds for the gross substitutes class considered in
Table 1: after the adjustment, GS valuations remain GS.
Then, we run the one-sided mechanism Mα on the resulting hypergraph Gˆ “ pB Y Sˆ, Eˆ, vˆBq
consisting of all buyers, only the sellers in Sˆ, and hyperedge valuations vˆB. This will lead to an
allocation S1, . . . , Sn and payments p
Mα
b pSiq for each bi P B.
Afterwards, we assign sets S1, . . . , Sn to buyer b1, . . . , bn increasing buyer bi’s payment relative
to the payment in the one-sided mechanism by the sum of the samples v1s for s P Si and pay each
seller s P Sˆ whose item has been sold the respective sample v1s.
The construction given in our mechanism is stated in the value-oracle model, and direct compu-
tation of the adjusted valuations would be inefficient. We provide a discussion on how to implement
the mechanism efficiently in Section 5.3. For purposes of our analysis, we assume that the one-sided
mechanism Mα always assigns each buyer an inclusion-minimal set of items giving the according
buyer at least the same utility (this can, e.g., be ensured by employing a simple type of tie-breaking
which favors small sets over larger ones).
ALGORITHM 3: 2XOS
Set Sˆ “ H, Eˆ “ H
for all s P S do
Propose to s a price of v1s
if s accepts then
Set Sˆ “ Sˆ Y tsu
end
end
for all pb, Sq P B ˆ 2Sˆ do
vˆbpSq “ řsPS¯pab,S¯psq ´ v1sq, where S¯ “ argmaxS˚ĎSXSˆ tvbpS˚q ´řsPS˚ v1su
Eˆ “ Eˆ Y tpb, Squ
end
Let A be the assignment on Gˆ induced by running Mα on the hypergraph
Gˆ “ pB Y Sˆ, Eˆ, vˆBq, with hyperedge weights vˆB, presenting buyers to Mα according to its
input requirements (e.g., offline or in random order)
for all pb, Sq P A do
b pays price ppb,Sq “ pMαb pSq `
ř
sPS v
1
s, where p
Mα
b pSq is the price charged to b by Mα
b gets assigned the items in S
for each s P S do
s receives a payment of v1s
end
end
5.2 Proof of Theorem 8
We start by establishing the individual rationality, truthfulness, and budget balance properties of
the two-sided mechanism claimed in Theorem 8.
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Lemma 4. Given that an IR and IC one-sided mechanism Mα is used, the two-sided mechanism
2XOS is IC, IR, and WBB.
Proof. Let’s fix any realization of the valuations. We start by showing truthfulness. Fix a seller
s P S: the only interaction s has with the algorithm is by accepting or rejecting the posted price
v1s, which is independent of vs, in exchange for his item, which is clearly truthful and individually
rational.
Fixing a buyer b: the algorithm will ask about his valuation and modify it to
vˆbpSq “
ÿ
sPS¯
pab,S¯psq ´ v1sq, where S¯ “ argmax
S‹ĎSXSˆ
#
vbpS‹q ´
ÿ
sPS‹
v1s
+
,
reflecting that any item s will cost at least v1s. This is done because Mα only involves items, not
sellers, so the extra v1s is charged afterwards.
argmax
S1 is available
tvˆbpS1q´pMαb pS1q|vˆbpS1q ě pMαb pS1qu
“ argmax
S1 is available
#
vbpS1q ´
ÿ
sPS1
v1s ´ pMαb pS1q | vbpS1q ě
ÿ
sPS1
v1s ` pMαb pS1q
+
,
with the left hand side reflecting that Mα is truthful and the right hand side being exactly what
buyer b is trying to maximize.
Given that no trade is generated if for all sets vbpS1q ă řsPS1 v1s, the mechanism is also indi-
vidually rational. For any trade, the seller’s price is v1s and the buyer’s v1s ` pMαb psq ě v1s, so the
mechanism is budget balanced.
We now give the proof of the approximation ratio in Theorem 8.
Lemma 5. Given that an α-approximate one-sided mechanism Mα is used, the two-sided mecha-
nism 2XOS is p2α ` 1tα ă 1.5uq-approximate.
Proof. Recall that the adjusted buyer valuations in the graph Gˆ were defined as
vˆbpSq “
ÿ
sPS¯
pab,S¯psq ´ v1sq, where S¯ “ argmax
S˚ĎSXSˆ
#
vbpS‹q ´
ÿ
sPS‹
v1s
+
Fix a pair pb, Sq of buyer and set of items. Also fix a realization vB of buyers’ valuations. Then in
expectation over the sellers’ valuations and their samples, it holds since s P Sˆ if and only if vs ď v1s:
Erv1s|s P Sˆs “ Ermaxtvs, v1sus ď Er2vss (11)
Note that for every pair pb, S1q, and every realization of buyer and seller valuations and samples
implies an according maximizing set in the definition of vˆbpS1q, which we will denote as S¯pS1q. With
this, we show
E rvˆbpSqs “ E
»
– ÿ
sPS¯pSq
´
ab,S¯pSqpsq ´ v1s
¯fifl
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ě E
»
– ÿ
sPSXSˆ
`
ab,Spsq ´ v1s
˘
`
fi
fl
“
ÿ
sPSXSˆ
E
”`
ab,Spsq ´ v1s
˘
`
ı
“
ÿ
sPS
E
”`
ab,Spsq ´ v1s
˘
` |s P Sˆ
ı
P
´
s P Sˆ
¯
ě 1
2
ÿ
sPS
E
”
ab,Spsq ´ v1s|s P Sˆ
ı
ě 1
2
ÿ
sPS
E rab,Spsq ´ 2vss
“ 1
2
E
«ÿ
sPS
ab,Spsq
ff
´ E
«ÿ
sPS
vs
ff
“ 1
2
vbpSq ´ E
«ÿ
sPS
vs
ff
.
The first inequality follows from the fact that since S¯ maximizes vbpS˚q´řsPS˚ v1s, always choosing
those s P S X Sˆ for which ab,Spsq ´ v1s ě 0 can only perform worse. Basic transformations and the
fact that every s P S is included in Sˆ with probability at least 1
2
result in the second inequality, at
which point we simply plug in Equation 11.
For the social welfare induced by a maximum-welfare assignment OPT in graph G, we have
SWOPT “
ÿ
pb,S1qPOPT
vbpS1q `
ÿ
sPSzOPT
vs .
Note that in our mechanism, each buyer will only be assigned a valuation-maximizing, inclusion-
minimal set S¯ from the definition of vˆb. Denote by OPT1´sided an optimal assignment (hyper-
matching) in the original graph G, i.e., an optimal solution to the one-sided problem with original
valuations vb. Then, for the social welfare induced by our assignment A over Gˆ, it holds
E rSWAs “ E
»
– ÿ
pb,S¯qPA
vbpS¯q `
ÿ
sPSzA
vs
fi
fl
ě E
»
– ÿ
pb,S¯qPA
vˆbpS¯q `
ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl
ě E
»
– ÿ
pb,SqPOPT1´sided
1
α
vˆbpSq `
ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl
ě E
»
– ÿ
pb,SqPOPT1´sided
1
α
˜
1
2
vbpSq ´
ÿ
sPS
vs
¸
`
ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl
“ E
»
– ÿ
pb,SqPOPT1´sided
1
2α
vbpSq ´
ÿ
sPOPT1´sided
1
α
vs `
ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl
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ě E
»
– ÿ
pb,SqPOPT1´sided
1
2α
vbpSq `
ˆ
1´ 1
α
˙ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl
ě E
»
– ÿ
pb,SqPOPT
1
2α
vbpSq `
ˆ
1´ 1
α
˙ÿ
sPS
vs
fi
fl .
Here, the first inequality stems from the fact that the vˆb are already discounted by
ř
sPS¯ v
1
s ě vs.
Since Mα is an α-approximation to the optimum in Gˆ, also the second inequality also holds true.
Finally, we plug in the lower bound to vˆb proven above. The expectation here is taken over all
realizations of buyer valuations, seller valuations, and samples of seller valuations.
We can, for certain, just conclude that E rSWOPT s “ E
”ř
pb,SqPOPT vbpSq `
ř
sPSzOPT vs
ı
ď
2αE rSWAs ` E rSWAs. However, assuming that 12α ď 1 ´ 1α , the last of above lower bounds to
E rSWAs also yields
E rSWAs ě E
»
– 1
2α
¨
˝ ÿ
pb,SqPOPT
vbpSq `
ÿ
sPS
vs
˛
‚
fi
fl ě 1
2α
E rOPT s .
Since 1
2α
ď 1 ´ 1
α
is equivalent to α ě 3
2
, we get that our mechanism is a p2α ` 1tα ă 1.5uq-
approximation.
5.3 Computational Aspects
We briefly give some remarks regarding the computational complexity of our mechanism. The
adjusted valuations vˆB are stated with an argmax over subsets of S, which—depending on the
computational model—may not be an efficient operation.
An alternative, which works for GS, is to for all S Ď S define v¯bpSq “
`ř
sPSXSˆ pab,Spsq ´ v1sq
˘
`.
As before it can be shown that if the original valuations are GS, then the modified valuations
are GS as well. A difference between v¯B and vˆB is that the former need not be monotone, but
monotonicity is not required by poly-time algorithms for GS valuations (see, e.g., [36]). Moreover,
the approximation guarantee of the one-sided mechanism run on v¯B also applies if the resulting
assignment is evaluated with the original adjusted valuations vˆB and the benchmark is the optimal
allocation under the original adjusted valuations vˆB, which is the only property of the one-sided
mechanism that we used in our proof above (see Appendix F).
In addition, note that while our mechanism is stated for the case of value queries, it can be
formulated also for demand queries—as required by poly-time mechanisms for XOS valuations
such as [1]—by adjusting the prices proposed instead of the buyer valuations. Here, it is simply
necessary to increase the Mα-prices of any S Ď SX Sˆ by řsPS v1s. This does not reflect the capping
of our adjusted valuations to a minimum contribution of 0 for each seller, but—having the same
effect—buyers will never demand the according items.
Finally, observe that if we are allowed to use demand queries (as is the poly-time mechanisms
for XOS valuations), then we can also efficiently implement value queries to the adjusted valuations
vˆB: First issue a demand query to find the set S
‹ in the argmax, and then issue a value query to
obtain the value vbpS‹q of the corresponding set.
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6 Conclusion and Further Directions
We have initiated the study of simple and efficient mechanisms for two-sided markets that use only
limited information from the priors, in most cases just a single sample from each distribution. This
line of research is of specific relevance for two-sided markets since efficient mechanisms with the
desired requirements are only possible in the Bayesian setting and, moreover, the optimal Bayesian
mechanism is complicated and known only for restricted cases. Our results are very general, and
in several cases even improve on the best known approximation guarantee with perfect knowledge
of the distributions. Our results can be extended further by identifying new efficient single-sample
mechanisms for the one-sided versions of the problems. Finally, we leave open the problem of
devising single sample mechanisms for the challenging problem of optimizing the gain from trade
in two-sided markets.
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A Counterexample for Posting the Mean of the Seller Distribu-
tion
We provide an example that shows that it is not possible to “derandomize” the SamplePrice
mechanism, and simply use the mean of the seller distribution as a posted price.
Example 1. Suppose the buyer deterministically has a very high value h " 2. The seller has a value
of 1 with probability ǫ and a value of 2 with probability 1 ´ ǫ. The mean of the seller distribution
is 2 ´ ǫ, which is just below her high value of 2. The social welfare that results from price 2´ ǫ is
ǫh` p1´ ǫq2, while the optimal social welfare is h.
B Proof of Theorem 4
We give a proof of the lower bound of 2 for “deterministic” sample-based two-sided mechanisms
for bilateral trade that are given a single sample from either of the two distributions, and for any
given sample that they see post a fixed price.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let vb and vs denote the random variables corresponding to the seller and
the buyer valuations. We first consider mechanisms that receive a single sample from the seller
distribution. Let ppsq be the price posted by the mechanism upon receiving sample s. We distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: D sˆ such that ppsˆq ě 2 ¨ sˆ: In this case consider a seller whose value is exactly sˆ and a
buyer whose value is exactly p2 ´ ǫq ¨ sˆ for some ǫ ą 0. Clearly, the optimal welfare is p2 ´ ǫq ¨ sˆ.
However, in the posted-price mechanism seller and buyer do not trade, which results in social
welfare sˆ giving an approximation ratio of 2´ ǫ.
Case 2: E sˆ such that ppsˆq ě 2 ¨ sˆ: Consider a seller whose valuation vs takes a uniformly
random value in t1, 1{2, 1{22, . . . , 1{2ku and a buyer with fixed value vb “ 1. Clearly, the optimal
welfare is 1. Notice that the probability of a trade happening is:
P pP psq ě vsq “
kÿ
i“0
P
ˆ
p
ˆ
1
2i
˙
ě vs
˙
¨ P
ˆ
s “ 1
2i
˙
“
kÿ
i“0
P
ˆ
p
ˆ
1
2i
˙
ě vs
˙
¨ 1
k ` 1
ď
kÿ
i“0
k ´ i
k ` 1 ¨
1
k ` 1
“ k
2 ¨ pk ` 1q
where we used that pp1{2iq ă 1{2i´1 therefore the price posted does not reach the next possible
valuation. Clearly, this converges to a 2-approximation as k grows to infinity.
It remains to show the claim for posted-price mechanisms that receive a single sample from the
buyer’s distribution. As before, let ppbq denote the price posted by the mechanism upon receiving
sample b.
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Case 1: D bˆ such that ppbˆq ď bˆ{2 : In this case, consider a buyer with value bˆ and a seller with
value bˆp1 ` ǫq{2 for any ǫ ą 0. The optimal welfare is clearly bˆ, but because the posted price is
smaller than the seller’s value the obtained welfare is a 2{p1 ` ǫq approximation.
Case 2: D bˆ such that ppbˆq ą bˆ: in this case if the buyer has value bˆ no trade will be made, no
matter how small the value of the seller, leading to an unbounded approximation ratio.
Case 3: @ bˆ we have that bˆ{2 ă ppbˆq ď bˆ: Consider an instance where the buyer’s valuation is ǫ
or z " 3ǫ with equal probability, while the seller always has value 3ǫ. Clearly, the expected optimal
welfare is at least z{2. For the mechanism to generate a trade, the sample and the real value of
the buyer need to be z, by the condition on ppbˆq. The welfare of the mechanism is z{4 ` 3ǫ ¨ 3{4,
leading to a 4-approximation as ǫÑ 0.
C Bilateral Trade with Many Samples
We devise a mechanism for simulating the performance of RandomQuantile of Blumrosen and
Dobzinski [8] using only access to multiple samples from Fs. As in [8], the analysis works for
any distributions Fs and Fb. However, for notational convenience we assume that the probability
density function fs exists as well. We do this so that there is a one to one correspondence between
the the value of the seller vs and its quantile. Formally, we want that the following equation has a
solution vs, for all x:
P pFSpvsq ď xq “ xÑ qpxq “ vs.
This may not be true for distributions with point masses, but we can handle it using a standard
smoothing trick, as used by Rubinstein et al. [38]. In a nutshell, we assume that we draw from a
joint probability distribution Fs, U r0, 1s, where the second coordinate is used for tie breaking. This
induces a strict ordering on the samples, as the point masses are ordered by the uniform draw and
the above equation always has a solution. Notice that sometimes there may be more than one
solution, but this is not an issue: the probability that we observe two of them in the same set of
samples is 0.
C.1 The SampleQuantile algorithm
The RandomQuantile mechanism draws a quantile z from a carefully chosen distribution, and
posts the price p that corresponds to this quantile.
Our mechanism, tries to guess the price p that corresponds to quantile z using the empirical
order statistics of the samples drawn. The key point is that it always tries to slightly underestimate
the quantile of p. This is important: overestimating p will make the deal less desirable to the buyer,
while underestimating to the seller. Since RandomQuantile assumes nothing about the buyer,
it is safer to only occur extra losses due to uncertainty from the seller’s side.
Formally, our mechanism, which we refer to as SampleQuantile has parameters n ě 0,
1{e ą δ ą 0, and works as follows:
1. Sample z P r1{e, 1s with CDF lnpe ¨ xq.
2. Draw ℓ samples from Fs.
3. Sort the samples in increasing order and choose the pz ´ δ
2e
q ¨ ℓ-th one. Call that sample p.
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4. Post price p and allow the agents to trade.
Notational remark: Above and in the following we will consider the ordinal of the quantile rounded
to the nearest smaller integer.
C.2 Analysis of SampleQuantile
We will do a good chunk of our analysis in quantile space, and in particular exploit that the the
quantiles of the randomly drawn samples from Fs follow the uniform distribution.
We will need the following concentration result:
Lemma 6. Let Xpc¨ℓq be the c ¨ ℓ-th order statistic out of ℓ samples drawn independently from
U r0, 1s.
P
`|Xpc¨ℓq ´ c| ě δ˘ ď 2 ¨ e´2ℓδ2 . (12)
Proof. We have that:
P
`
Xpc¨ℓq ď c´ δ
˘ “ P pmore than c ¨ ℓ samples picked ď c´ δq
“ P
˜
1
n
ℓÿ
i“1
Yi ě c
¸
“ P
˜
1
n
ℓÿ
i“1
Yi ´ pc´ δq ě δ
¸
ď e´2ℓδ2 ,
where the inequality follows from the Chernoff bound on the ℓ, i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables Yi
with expectation c´ δ, indicating that the corresponding sample was smaller than c´ δ. Similarly:
P
`
Xpc¨ℓq ě c` δ
˘ “ P pless than c ¨ ℓ samples picked ď c` δq
ď e´2ℓδ2 .
Combining the two inequalities gives us the result.
Let SWppq denote the social welfare achieved by posting price p. The second main ingredient in
our proof will be the following lemma, which asserts that if two prices are close in quantile space,
then they also achieve similar expected social welfare.
Lemma 7. For any p ď p‹ such that
Fsppq ě Fspp‹qp1´ δq, for some δ P p0, 1q, (13)
then,
E rSWppqs ě E rSWpp‹qs p1´ 2δq (14)
Proof. Let us use the shorthand vb and vs to denote the random variables that represent the buyer
valuation and the seller valuation, respectively.
Since p ď p‹, the only source of inefficiency for price p is that the seller might not accept to
trade because the price is too low. This is only 1 ´ δ times less likely to happen than when p‹ is
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used. Specifically, it happens when p‹ ě vs ą p, but this happens rarely, and generates negligible
welfare from the buyer’s side compared to when vs ě p‹. Notice that if the buyer accepts p‹,
then clearly she would accept p as well. Therefore, assuming the p has been properly selected, the
expected social welfare generated by posting price p is:
E rSWppqs “ E rvs ¨ 1tvs ą p‹us ` E rvs ¨ 1tp‹ ě vs ą pus ` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ă pus
` E rvb ¨ 1tvs ď p^ p‹ ą vb ě pus ` E rvb ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ě p‹us (15)
“ E rvs ¨ 1tvs ą p‹us ` E rvs ¨ 1tp‹ ě vs ą pus ` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ă pus
` E rvb ¨ 1tvs ď p^ p‹ ą vb ě pus ` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pvs ď pq (16)
ě E rvs ¨ 1tvs ą p‹us ` E rvs ¨ 1tp‹ ě vs ą pus ` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ă pus
` E rvb ¨ 1tvs ď p^ p‹ ą vb ě pus ` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pvs ď p‹q p1´ δq (17)
ě E rvs ¨ 1tvs ą p‹us
` E rvs ¨ 1tp‹ ě vs ą pus ` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pvs ď p‹q δ
` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ă pus ` E rvb ¨ 1tvs ď p^ p‹ ą vb ě pus
` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pvs ď p‹q p1´ 2δq (18)
ě E rvs ¨ 1tvs ą p‹us
` E rvs ¨ 1tp‹ ě vs ą pusP pvb ă p‹q ` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pp‹ ě vs ą pq
` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ vb ă pus ` E rvs ¨ 1tvs ď p^ p‹ ą vb ě pus
` E rvb ¨ 1tvb ě p‹usP pvs ď p‹q p1´ 2δq (19)
ě E rSWpp‹qs p1´ 2δq, (20)
where in Equation (16) we used the independence of vs and vb, in Inequality (17) we used Equation
(13), in Inequality (18) we reorganized the terms and moved the δ part of the last term around to
match the cases in the expected welfare of setting price p‹, and in Inequality (19) we used Equation
(13) again and scaled one term by P pvb ă p‹q.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem for the SampleQuantile mechanism.
Theorem 9. Denote by xSQ the allocation rule of SampleQuantile and by xRQ the allocation
rule of RandomQuantile. For any 1{e ą δ ą 0, given ℓ samples we have:
E rSWpxSQpvB , vSqqs ě E rSWxRQpvB , vSqs p1´ 2δqp1 ´ 2 ¨ e´2np δ2e q
2q. (21)
Proof. As before we use the shorthands vb and vs to denote the random variable corresponding to
the buyer’s and seller’s valuation, respectively.
For any z P r1{e, 1s, we denote with p‹pzq the quantile price of RandomQuantile for which
FSpp‹pzqq “ z. For what concerns our mechanism, we use n samples to calculate an appropriate
P pzq such that FSpP pzqq « z. We remark that, given z, p‹pzq is a deterministic value, while P pzq
is a random variable, whose randomness is given by the sampling procedure.
Every time we sample from Fs the values themselves are not uniformly distributed, but their
quantiles are. This is clear, because
P pFspvsq ď xq “ x.
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Therefore, the quantiles of the samples drawn behave like order statistics of the uniform distribution;
given two samples s1 ď s2, we might not know their exact quantiles but we do know that Fsps1q ď
Fsps2q. From Lemma 6, we have that:
P
ˆˇˇˇ
ˇFspP pzqq ´
ˆ
Fspp‹pzqq ´ δ
2e
˙ˇˇˇ
ˇ ě δ2e
˙
ď 2 ¨ e´2ℓp δ2eq2 ,
where the probability is taken over P . However, since Fspp‹pzqq ě 1{e:
P pFspp‹pzqq ě FspP pzqq ě Fspp‹pzqqp1 ´ δqq ď 2 ¨ e´2ℓp δ2e q
2
. (22)
Therefore, by applying Lemma 7 for P pzq and p‹pzq and taking into account the probability given
by Inequality (22) that the realization of P pzq does not have the desired property (in which case
we assume no welfare was generated) we have:
E rSWpP pzqqs ě E rSWpp‹pzqqs p1´ 2δqp1 ´ 2 ¨ e´2ℓp δ2e q2q. (23)
We obtain the claimed approximation guarantee by taking expectations over the possible values of
z, which follows the same distribution as in [8].
Corollary 1. For every ε P p0, 4
e
q, given ℓ “ 16e2
ε2
logp4
ε
q samples, SampleQuantile provides in
expectation the following approximation guarantee of the optimal expected social welfare
E rSWpxSQpvB , vSqqs ě p1´ εq
ˆ
1´ 1
e
˙
E rSWpOPT pvB , vSqqs
ě
ˆ
1´ 1
e
´ ε
˙
E rSWpOPT pvB , vSqqs .
Proof. If we use δ “ ε
4
in the SampleQuantile and we set ℓ “ 16e2
ε2
logp4
ε
q, we get the Corollary
directly from Theorem 9 and [8].
D General Proof of Lemma 3
We show how to generalize the proof of Lemma 3 to the case where distributions are allowed to
have atoms.
Proof of Lemma 3. We can proceed exactly as in the proof provided in the body of the paper,
except for the derivation of the lower bound on the expected contribution to social welfare of a
fixed buyer Bi with fixed valuation vBi and a random seller s. We claim that this contribution is
at least p2´?3q ¨ vBi as in the continuous case.
If the seller distributions are allowed to have atoms, then equality (6) may not have a solution.
In order to overcome we will, as in the body of the paper consider some t and do a case distinction
based on whether vBi ď t or vBi ą t. For vBi ď t we argue as in the continuous case that
the expected contribution is at least 1
2
F ptq2vBi . For the case vBi ă t we use a slightly different
argument. Namely, using the expected value of the seller as a lower bound we obtain that the
expected contribution is at least
E rvs | t ą vBis “ E rvss “ E
“
v1s
‰ ě E “v1s ˇˇ v1s ě vBi‰ ¨ P `v1s ě vBi˘
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ě p1´ F pvBiqqvBi ě
´
1´ F
´
t`vBi
2
¯¯
vBi .
So the expected contribution of buyer Bi and its random partner s to the social welfare is at least
vBi ¨ LBptq, where
LBptq ě
#
1
2
F ptq2 if t ď vBi
1´ F
´
vBi`t
2
¯
if t ą vBi
We now choose t‹ “ mintt|F ptq ě ?3 ´ 1u, i.e., the (jumping) point of function F for which
F pt‹q ě ?3´ 1, and F pt1q ă ?3´ 1 for all t1 ă t‹. Using this t‹ we can lower bound the expected
contribution of Bi and s as follows:
ě vBi ¨min
!
1
2
F pt‹q2, 1´ F
´
vBi`t‹
2
¯)
ě vBi ¨min
!
1
2
2p2 ´?3q, 2´?3
)
“ vBi ¨min
!
2´?3, 2´?3
)
“ vBi ¨ p2´
?
3q,
as claimed.
E Proof: Adjusted Valuations from Section 5 are XOS
The adjusted valuations vˆb were defined as
vˆbpSq “
ÿ
sPS¯
pab,S¯psq ´ v1sq, where S¯ “ argmax
S‹ĎSXSˆ
#
vbpS‹q ´
ÿ
sPS‹
v1s
+
This captures the fact that only items in Sˆ are available for trade, and whenever a buyer is assigned
some item s, he will be required to pay an additional v1s later. Therefore, his valuation for S is no
more than his valuation for the best subset of it in Sˆ, minus the sum of the according v1s. This
function is XOS because it can be described as the maximum over the following XOS-support: for
all a from the support of the original vb and s P S, define
aˆpsq “ papsq ´ v1sq` if s P Sˆ, and 0 otherwise.
For the v¯, defined as
v¯bpSq “
¨
˝ ÿ
sPSXSˆ
`
ab,Spsq ´ v1s
˘˛‚
`
,
we define the XOS support
a¯psq “ papsq ´ v1sq if s P Sˆ, and 0 otherwise,
and add an additonal function a0 which is 0 for any s P S.
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F Equivalence of the Adjusted Valuations
Lemma 8. Any inclusion-minimal assignment ALG made by the algorithm run with adjusted
valuations v¯ instead of vˆ will provide the same approximation to the optimum welfare.
Proof. Note that the v¯b are in the class XOS (see Appendix E), so Mα’s approximation guarantee
holds up. Also, for any pair pb, Sq with b P B, S Ď Sˆ: vˆbpSq ě v¯bpSq , since vˆbpSq results from
picking an optimal subset from S.
Let Sopt be an inclusion-minimal, utility-preserving set of items assigned to buyer b, which is
a subset of b’s assigned bundle Sb in an optimal hypermatching OPT pGˆq of graph Gˆ as defined in
our algorithm, i.e.
v¯bpSoptq “
ÿ
sPSopt
pab,Soptpsq ´ v1sq, where Sopt “ argmax
S‹ĎSbXSˆ
#
vbpS‹q ´
ÿ
sPS‹
v1s
+
.
It holds by definition
v¯pSoptq “
ÿ
sPSopt
pab,Soptpsq ´ v1sq
and therefore, the weight of an optimal assignment is the same for both v¯ and vˆ. Combining these
facts, we get for the weight of the hypermatching Av¯ returned by the algorithm when using the
valuations v¯B:ÿ
pb,SqPAv¯
v¯bpSq ě c ¨OPT pG¯q “ c ¨OPT pGˆq ùñ
ÿ
pb,SqPAv¯
vˆbpSq ě c ¨OPT pGˆq
and this is what we needed in the proof of the approximation ratio.
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